<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="6.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Manuel Bernardo Barbosa</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pooya Farshim</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Relations among Notions of Complete Non-malleability: Indistinguishability Characterisation and Efficient Construction without Random Oracles</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Proceedings of 15th Australasian Conference - ACISP</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lecture Notes in Computer Science</style></tertiary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">July</style></date></pub-dates></dates><urls><related-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">https://haslab.uminho.pt/sites/default/files/mbb/files/strongcca_full.pdf</style></url></related-urls></urls><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sydney, Australia</style></pub-location><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">6168</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">145-163</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">978-3-642-14080-8</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;We study relations among various notions of complete non-malleability, where an adversary can tamper with both ciphertexts and public-keys, and ciphertext indistinguishability. We follow the pattern of relations previously established for standard non-malleability. To this end, we propose a more convenient and conceptually simpler indistinguishability-based security model to analyse completely non-malleable schemes. Our model is based on strong decryption oracles, which provide decryptions under arbitrarily chosen public keys. We give the first precise definition of a strong decryption oracle, pointing out the subtleties in different approaches that can be taken. We construct the first efficient scheme, which is fully secure against strong chosen-ciphertext attacks, and therefore completely non-malleable, without random oracles.&lt;/p&gt;
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